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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. INITIATION OF ACTION
A. Jurisdiction
The plaintiff in Moses v. South Carolina Highway
Department' was arrested and charged with operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. His
driver's license was suspended for refusal to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test after being advised of the consequences of refusal; the
suspension was lifted when he requested a hearing but was rein-
stated pursuant to the findings of the hearing officer.2 Moses then
brought an action in the Civil Court of Florence County challeng-
ing the procedure and decision on several constitutional and non-
constitutional grounds.
The trial judge treated this action as a petition for writ of
certiorari, requesting an oral return by the hearing officer of the
administrative proceedings. He then ruled that the statutory
hearing, limited so as to deny the individual the right to contest
whether there was probable cause for his arrest, was unconstitu-
tional as a denial of due process violative of the fourteenth
amendment.
3
On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined
that the lower court was without jurisdiction to review the admin-
istrative decision of the Highway Department, and the decision
was reversed. The determining factor was that the lower court
had been asked to review alleged errors on the part of the hearing
examiner and had in fact treated the proceeding as an appeal. In
spite of the character of the final decision by the lower court,
certiorari is appellate in nature when used to examine the action
of an inferior tribunal.4 Because the only appellate jurisdiction
granted to the Civil Court of Florence County is to hear appeals
from magistrates' courts within the county,5 it did not have
jurisdiction of the action.
1. 258 S.C. 233, 187 S.E.2d 888 (1972).
2. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-344 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
3. Record at 9, Moses v. South Carolina Highway Dept., 258 S.C. 233, 187 S.E.2d
888 (1972).
4. See City of Columbia v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 S.C. 528, 131
S.E.2d 705 (1963).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1610 (1962).
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B. Venue
The question in Williams v. Chrysler Motors Corp.' was
whether the lower court erred in transferring the case for trial
from Darlington County to Florence County. The supreme court
noted the established South Carolina rule that the trial court has
both the authority and the responsibility to decide whether one
defendant has been joined solely to permit the action to be tried
in a place other than where the real defendant is entitled to be
tried. It then proceeded to examine the evidence to determine
whether that had occurred in this case.
The action was one for alleged fraud and deceit in the sale
of a new truck, commenced against the manufacturer, the dealer,
and an employee of the dealer residing in Darlington County. It
was conceded that, except for the joinder of the employee, the
venue would properly lie in Florence County. The undisputed
evidence showed that the employee had been parts manager and
later shop foreman during the period in question, but his closest
connection with repair attempts on the truck had been the after-
the-fact completion of two forms to support the dealer's reim-
bursement claim against Chrysler for repairs under warranty.
On these facts the supreme court found full evidentiary sup-
port for the lower court's decision that the employee was an im-
material defendant. It thus affirmed the order transferring the
case to Florence County.
C. Limitations of Actions
Miller v. Dickert7 presented a textbook problem in statutory
interpretation. At issue was section 10-104 of the Code,8 which
6. 193 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 1972).
7. 259 S.C. 1, 190 S.E.2d 459 (1972).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-104 (1962) reads as follows:
If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in article 3 of this chapter,
except for a penalty or forfeiture or against a sheriff or other office for an escape,
be at the time the cause of action accrued ither:
(1) Within the age of twenty-one years;
(2) Insane; or
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal or civil charge or in execution under the
sentence of a criminal court for a less term than his natural life;
The time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commence-
ment of the action, except that the period within which the action must be
brought cannot be extended:
(1) More than five years by any such disability, except infancy; nor
(2) In any case longer than one year after the disability ceases.
1973]
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gives certain relief from statutes of limitations to persons under
specified disabilities at the time the cause of action accrues. The
facts as alleged by plaintiff clearly presented the issue. He
claimed that on July 31, 1969, the two defendant doctors know-
ingly and without examining plaintiff signed a false medical cer-
tificate which led to his involuntary commitment to the state
hospital for the mentally ill. He further alleged that on August
1, 1969, he was arrested and committed to the hospital, where he
remained until his discharge on August 28, 1969. Plaintiff later
commenced this action for false imprisonment on August 27,
1971. The statute of limitations for such an action is two years;9
both parties agreed that the alleged cause of action accrued on
August 1, 1969, the time of the plaintiff's arrest.
Plaintiff conceded that his action would be barred unless
salvaged by section 10-104. He claimed that he was "imprisoned
on a civil charge" when the cause of action accrued, and that the
two year statute did not begin to run until the disability was
removed on August 28, 1969. For support he relied on a statement
in the 1883 case of Shubrick v. Adams ° that, "where a party is
under a legal disability at the time his right of action accrues, the
statute is not put in operation until the disability ceases.""
Defendants contended that under the literal language of the
section, it could never operate to extend the period for bringing
an action beyond one year after the disability has terminated. For
judicial support of this interpretation, they relied most heavily on
Fricks v. Lewis, 2 which was decided only four years after
Shubrick but did not mention it. The court in Fricks, after a
lengthy discussion 3 of several possible constructions of the stat-
ute, decided that in no case could the statute operate to extend
a period more than one year after removal of the disability, but
that neither could it ever operate to reduce a period otherwise
allowed.
In the case at hand the supreme court decided that the inter-
pretation in Fricks and its progeny was the correct and estab-
lished rule and that the plea of the statute of limitations should
have been sustained. As a matter of statutory construction this
position seems unassailable.' 4
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-145 (1962).
10. 20 S.C. 49 (1883).
11. Id. at 52.
12. 26 S.C. 237, 1 S.E. 884 (1887).
13. Id. at 241-44, 1 S.E. at 887-89.
14. It is interesting to note that after mentioning the statement from Shubrick the
[Vol. 25438
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IX. CONDUCT OF TRIAL
A. Pleading
Section 10-609 of the South Carolina Code 5 allows the trial
judge discretion to permit an answer to be filed after the specified
20 days 6 have expired. Rule 19 of the Circuit Court Rules 17 quali-
fies this by requiring a certificate from defendant's counsel that
he believes defendant has a good and substantial defense upon
the merits. Defendant in Bledsoe v. Metts" was granted such a
privilege to file his answer on the ground that there was excusable
neglect for his failure to answer within the statutory period.
Plaintiff appealed, challenging the judge's findings and order as
an abuse of discretion.
The supreme court said that such a decision would be over-
turned only upon "a clear showing of abuse of discretion,"' 9 and
then proceeded to emphasize just how difficult it would be to
make such a showing in these circumstances:
We have held that Section 10-609 of the Code should be given a
liberal construction in furtherance of justice and in order that
cases may be tried and disposed of upon their merits ....
When a party makes a showing of mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect and applies promptly for relief after
notice and makes a prima facie showing of a meritorious de-
fense, answer should be permitted to be filed."
Not surprisingly, in light of the mood established by this state-
ment, it was held that plaintiff had failed to show an erroneous
exercise of discretion.
B. Jury Selection
The plaintiff in the automobile collision case of Bowers v.
Watkins Carolina Express, Inc. ,21 was one of the three magistrates
for Hampton County where the trial occurred. Twenty-one of the
court did not overrule or distinguish it in any way. But the statement was pure dictum in
the Shubrick case and should obviously not be considered of value as precedent.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-609 (1962).
16. Id. § 10-641 (1962).
17. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 19.
18. 258 S.C. 500, 189 S.E.2d 291 (1972).
19. Id. at 503, 189 S.E.2d at 293.
20. Id. at 503-04, 189 S.E.2d at 293.
21. 259 S.C. 371, 192 S.E.2d 190 (1972).
1973]
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fifty-member jury panel for the case resided in the Estill-Scotia
area, which was plaintiff's principal area of service. Defendant
contended that this was a sufficient showing to raise an inference
of bias that required automatic disqualification of those twenty-
one; the supreme court disagreed, although it reversed the verdict
for plaintiff on another point discussed later in this article.
The court was careful to point out the alternative available
to defendant of requesting a voir dire examination of the jury
panel pursuant to section 38-202 of the Code,22 thus enabling
further inquiry into the jurors' impartiality. Having failed to take
advantage of a statutory provision directed at just such a situa-
tion, the defendant was unlikely to find the court receptive to his
claim of prejudicial error.
C. Testimony
Two cases during the survey period involved significant ques-
tions about the propriety of testimony by witnesses for the plain-
tiff. The first of these, Carolina Home Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong
Furnace Co.,1 was a suit for damages allegedly caused to an
apartment complex by defective heating and cooling equipment
manufactured by defendant.
The testimony at issue was given by plaintiff's president,
when he stated without objection that twenty-five or thirty ten-
ants had moved from the apartments because of the unsatisfac-
tory air conditioner operation. This estimate was based on
personal communications with tenants before the air conditioner
was repaired. The president similarly testified as to the rate of
vacancy during the period in question and the resulting loss of
rental income. Defendant's counsel not only made no attempt to
prevent such testimony but also conducted extensive cross-
examination on the subject. Defendant subsequently moved to
strike as conjecture all the testimony concerning lost rentals, but
the request was denied by the trial judge.
The supreme court held that this was not reversible error.
Any motion to strike evidence admitted without objection is ad-
dressed to the discretion of the court, imposing from the begin-
ning a heavy burden on one who would challenge such a ruling.
In this instance, the fact that counsel had conducted lengthy
cross-examination on the subject before making his motion sup-
22. S.C. ConE ANN. § 38-202 (1962).
23. 259 S.C. 346, 191 S.E.2d 774 (1972).
[Vol. 25
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plied ample basis for the discretionary refusal to strike the testi-
mony.
In Smoak v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.,24 a wrongful death
action involving a pickup truck and a freight train, defendant
complained of unresponsive answers made on cross-examination
by a witness for plaintiff. The witness, in answer to an unspecified
question, replied that there had been no accidents at the crossing
since the railroad company cut back the growth on the right-of-
way and put up a stop sign. The trial court sustained defendant's
objection and instructed the jury to disregard the answer of the
witness in its entirety.
Defendant also moved for a mistrial at the time of the objec-
tion but the motion was overruled. On appeal this refusal was
assigned as error, with defendant contending that it was preju-
diced by the overall effect of the testimony and the court's in-
structions. The supreme court disposed of this contention by not-
ing that such matters are within the discretion of the trial judge.
The court agreed that the error was not of sufficient magnitude
to warrant a mistrial and ruled that the judge properly cured the
error with his timely instruction. Feeling compelled to go fur-
ther, the court delivered the following commentary on the reali-
ties of litigation:
The answers cannot be attributed to counsel for plaintiffs, or to
the plaintiffs. They were spontaneous answers from one not ac-
customed to testifying. The defendant is not entitled to a perfect
trial, but only a fair trial. Hardly any case is completed without
some flaw. If a new trial were required every time a flaw or mere
possibility of prejudice occurred, litigation would be unduly pro-
longed.2'
D. Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
One of the more interesting trial situations during the survey
period is found in Bowers v. Watkins Carolina Express, Inc.26 This
was a personal injury case arising from a collision of plaintiff's
automobile and defendant's tractor-trailer. The accident oc-
curred at dusk in a light rain and mist, and the crucial issue was
which vehicle had crossed the center line of the roadway. There
24. 193 S.E.2d 594 (S.C. 1972). See Survey of Administrative Law supra.
25. Id. at 598.
26. 259 S.C. 371, 192 S.E.2d 190 (1972).
1973]
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were no eyewitnesses other than the two drivers, although there
were exhibits and testimony concerning marks on the highway.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
The waters were muddied, however, by the fact that plaintiff
was one of three magistrates in Hampton County, where the case
was tried in the circuit court. (The question of whether this has
any impact on jury selection has been discussed above.) The su-
preme court also chose to point out that plaintiff's counsel was
the solicitor of the judicial circuit encompassing Hampton
County, although it made no further mention of this fact in the
opinion.
In this setting plaintiff's counsel made the following state-
ment during his closing argument to the jury:
It has been testified that Karl Bowers is a magistrate in this
county. Now it just doesn't seem to be that a man of Karl
Bowers' type would get up here and tell you a deliberate false-
hood merely for money. I don't believe he's that kind of person.
If you don't bring in a verdict for him in this case, every time
you see Karl Bowers henceforth in the future, you ought to say
there goes a liar .... 1
Defendant's counsel objected at this point that the argument was
highly improper and prejudicial and requested proper instruc-
tion to the jury. Although the trial judge conceded that the argu-
ment could have been worded less suggestively, he overruled the
objection by failure to admonish counsel or instruct the jury, and
plaintiff's counsel continued his argument.
On appeal the supreme court granted a new trial. It recog-
nized that generally the conduct of a trial must be left largely to
the discretion of the trial judge, but decided that failure to sus-
tain this objection carried so great a possibility of prejudice that
the verdict could not be allowed to stand. The court read coun-
sel's argument as a deliberate attempt to exploit any reluctance
a juror might have to find against his magistrate, and as a plain
suggestion that the magistrate would remember any juror who
branded him a liar. Noting that the jury could reasonably have
found against plaintiff on the basis of a mistaken belief rather
than a deliberate falsehood, the court held that the argument was
not only unduly coercive but also falsely premised.
27. Id. at 375, 192 S.E.2d at 192.
442 [Vol. 25
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Any clear-cut value of the case as precedent is perhaps lost
in the uniqueness of the facts. Certainly both the status of the
plaintiff and the exact nature of the argument were important,
and perhaps the status of plaintiff's counsel was also a significant
factor. The court undertakes to state no rule or general principle
in its opinion, and the decision can probably be used in future
cases only by analogy.
E. Direction of Verdict
Another of many procedural points raised in Carolina Home
Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co."8 concerned the refusal
to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to certain
elements of damage. Testimony had been given at the trial con-
cerning structural damage to plaintiff's apartments allegedly re-
sulting from condensation spillage from the defective cooling
equipment manufactured by defendant. There was further testi-
mony relating to the installed cost of the equipment. At the close
of the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict absolving
it of liability for all damages which occurred after plaintiff discov-
ered the condensation problem, and also for the cost of the units
as an element of damage. The trial judge overruled both motions.
Citing the 1969 case of Wilson v. Glock"9 as controlling au-
thority, the supreme court pointed out that motions such as the
ones made by defendant are not recognized in South Carolina
practice; hence they were properly overruled. A motion for a di-
rected verdict "goes to the entire case and may be granted only
when the evidence raises no issue for the jury as to defendant's
liability. '3 It is implied in the Wilson case that defendant's pro-
per course of action would have been to seek jury instructions
concerning those elements of damage which it felt should not
have been considered.
F. Instructions to Jury
Defendant-appellant in the Carolina Home Builders case,
after challenging numerous instructions given by the trial judge,
finally achieved a reversal and a new trial on the basis of one such
challenge. For the most part these instructions were examined by
the supreme court solely to see whether they violated the settled
28. 259 S.C. 346, 191 S.E.2d 774 (1972).
29. 252 S.C. 309, 166 S.E.2d 207 (1969).
30. 259 S.C. at 358, 191 S.E.2d at 779.
1973]
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principle that instructions should be confined to issues raised by
the pleadings and evidence. Further discussion of most of these
points would concern primarily the law of negligence as applied
to the evidence, and this discussion would not be of interest here.
However, two points of a procedural nature did emerge.
Defendant complained of the fact that the instructions com-
bined both the theories of implied warranty and negligence,
asserting that a plaintiff cannot proceed on two distinct and
contrasting theories of law in one cause of action. The court did
not reach the question argued by plaintiff:31 Whether negligence
and implied warranty are actually contrasting theories under
changing ideas about the basis of recovery for implied warranty.
Instead, the court noted that plaintiff's complaint contained in a
single count allegations appropriate to breach of warranty and
others appropriate to negligence. Since defendant never made
either a motion to strike or a motion to elect, the judge was held
to have committed no error in including both theories of recovery
in the instructions. In other words, the trial judge is not required
on his own initiative to limit plaintiff to non-conflicting theories
of recovery, or to determine which theory plaintiff has implicitly
adopted from several set forth in his pleadings.
In another instruction the judge alluded to latent defects in
the product which could result in damages to the person using the
product. Defendant complained that this was inappropriate
because only property damage was involved in the case. The su-
preme court, however, decided this was not prejudicial error, not-
ing that the jury was unlikely to have been misled by the inappro-
priate use of the word "person." Construing the charge as a
whole, the court emphasized that the corporations involved had
been characterized earlier in the charge as legal persons, and that
the word "damages" was also defined elsewhere to encompass loss
from injury to property as well as personal injury.
G. Motion for New Trial
The discretion of the trial judge to grant a new trial was
discussed in Vandegrift v. Dent." The jury in this assault and
battery case had returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of
$50,000 actual damages and $25,000 punitive damages. Defen-
dant's motion for a new trial was granted upon three stated
31. See Brief for Respondent at 26.
32. 258 S.C. 240, 188 S.E.2d 185 (1972).
[Vol. 25
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grounds: (1) Improper and prejudicial jury argument by plain-
tiff's counsel; (2) erroneous exclusion of certain testimony offered
by defendant; (3) a verdict so excessive as to indicate caprice,
passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury.
The supreme court chose only to discuss the third ground in
affirming the lower court, stating that such a motion is addressed
to the discretion of the trial judge. As is frequently the case in
such a setting, the court perceived no need to discuss the facts of
the case and simply noted that the record fully sustained the
judge's conclusion that the verdict was out of all proportion
to the loss sustained. Plaintiff would have had to show the occurr-
ence of that undefinable "abuse of discretion," and in the opinion
of the court he had not done so.
III. JUDGMENT
A. General Requisites
The effect of a judgment issued without personal jurisdiction
over the affected party was forcefully illustrated in Webster v.
Clanton.3 3 The issue involved custody and support of a 14-year-
old boy, with the parties being the father of the child and a sister
of the deceased mother.
The father had originally been given custody in December
1970 after a lengthy hearing, but in April 1971 the lower court
entered an order awarding custody to the aunt. This latter order
was issued by the county judge largely on his own initiative,
based upon an oral complaint by the child, an examination of his
school grades, and a conference with a school guidance counselor
who did not know the father. There was no prior notice to the
father and no pleading by any of the parties.
Subsequently, there were two more orders issued directing
the father to make support payments to the aunt and authorizing
enrollment of the child in a private school. The first of these arose
pursuant to a petition by the aunt; there was an informal, unre-
corded conference in June 1971 between the court and counsel,
but no further hearing or notice to any party prior to the order
filed in November 1971. The second order came after a motion by
the father to vacate the first, based in part upon the alleged
nullity of the granting of custody to the aunt. This order, denying
the father's motion, was filed in December 1971.
33. 259 S.C. 387, 192 S.E.2d 214 (1972).
1973]
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The father appealed from the latter two orders of support
(November 1971 and December 1971) but not from the initial
order granting custody to the aunt (April 1971). Nevertheless, the
supreme court reversed the orders on appeal because of the inval-
idity of the initial custody proceeding. The court stated that the
April order, although not appealed, was void and of absolutely no
effect, with no appeal necessary to protect the father's rights.
Thus, because the aunt did not have lawful custody, the support
orders based upon that assumed custody were invalid. The court
summarized as follows:
It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party whose per-
sonal rights are to be affected by a personal judgment must have
a day in court, or opportunity to be heard, and that without due
notice and opportunity to be heard a court has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate such personal rights. A judgment by a court with-
out jurisdiction of both the parties and the subject matter is a
nullity and must be so treated by the courts whenever and for
whatever purpose it is presented and relied on. 4
B. Foreign Judgments
Another aspect of judgments rendered without jurisdiction
was discussed in Seymour v. Seymour. 5 Here the question was
whether the husband could challenge on jurisdictional grounds a
default divorce, child custody, and support decree issued in Kan-
sas in favor of the wife. The family court judge decided that he
could not challenge the decree. An order was issued giving full
faith and credit to the Kansas decree and granting enforcement
of its provisions as sought by the wife.
The supreme court reversed this order, stating that the full-
faith-and-credit clause of the Federal Constitution does not pre-
vent inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in another state
which rendered the judgment being offered in evidence. This also
means that the record of the judgment rendered elsewhere can be
contradicted as to the facts conferring jurisdiction, regardless of
any recital in the judgment that such facts actually did exist.
For support of these principles, the court cited State v.
Campbell,36 which in turn was based partially on the 1945 United
States Supreme Court case of Williams v. North Carolina.37 In
34. Id. at 391, 192 S.E.2d at 216.
35. 259 S.C. 26, 190 S.E.2d 502 (1972).
36. 242 S.C. 64, 129 S.E.2d 902 (1963).
37. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
[Vol. 25
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Williams, Justice Frankfurter conducted a thorough examination
of the policy factors allowing one state to reexamine the jurisdic-
tion underlying a foreign divorce order; he also indicated the
weight which should be attached to the findings of the sister
state.
C. Action on a Judgment
An action on a judgment in Garrison v. Owens 8 presented
several interesting questions to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. A default judgment had been obtained against defendant
on August 20, 1960; the judgment was assigned to plaintiff on
March 30, 1970, by her husband. On June 24, 1970, plaintiff
commenced this equitable action for the purpose of subjecting
certain land owned by defendant to payment of the judgment. A
motion to dismiss the complaint was heard by the trial judge
subsequent to August 20, 1970.
The motion for dismissal was based upon noncompliance
with Code section 10-1520,11 which requires leave of the court,
granted upon good cause and notice to the adverse party, before
an action on a judgment may be brought. The lower court judge
upheld this motion. He further held that the lien had expired
under Code section 10-15611o because the authorized ten-year pe-
riod had passed since the filing of the judgment. The judge de-
cided that the lien was not saved or extended merely by the
bringing of an action to enforce it, and that a lien expiring during
pendency of the action could not be enforced. The supreme court
affirmed on both grounds.
On the first point the court rejected plaintiff-appellant's
characterization of her action as something other than an action
upon a judgment. Looking at "its very essence," '4' the court said
its purpose was simply the collection of the judgment. Similarly
rejected was plaintiff's contention that section 10-1520 by its
terms was inapplicable to her because it only applies to an action
"between the same parties." The court chose to adopt the broad
rule that an assignee of a judgment stands in the place of the
38. 258 S.C. 442, 189 S.E.2d 31 (1972).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1520 (1962) reads in relevant part as follows: "No action
shall be brought upon a judgment rendered in any court in this State, except the court of
a magistrate, between the same parties without leave of the court, or a judge thereof at
chambers, for good cause shown on notice to the adverse party."
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1561 (1962).
41. 258 S.C. at 445, 189 S.E.2d at 33.
1973]
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assignor and cannot acquire any better rights with regard to the
judgment than possessed by the assignor.
Because section 10-1520 was operative, its effect was to leave
plaintiff without a complete cause of action, and the dismissal
was properly granted. Although the majority of states having
such a statute apparently treat noncompliance as a mere
irregularity that can be waived or cured,42 the established rule in
South Carolina is that the court is deprived of jurisdiction.1
3
With regard to the expiration of the lien, the court made the
following statement: "A judgment lien is purely statutory; its
duration as fixed by the legislature may not be prolonged by the
courts and the bringing of an action to enforce the lien will not
preserve it beyond the time fixed by the statute, if such time
expires before the action is tried."44 As authority the court cited
only a legal encyclopedia,45 although an annotation to Code sec-
tion 10-1561 makes the same statement and cites Hughes v.
Slater" as authority. In Hughes, the court did discuss the issue
in some detail but expressly declined to decide it." The court was
apparently aware of this and mentioned Hughes only as an ana-
logue.
D. Summary Judgment
The supreme court continued during the survey period to
develop case law interpreting the relatively new Circuit Court
Rule 4448 on the granting of summary judgment. Two cases in
particular contained fairly extensive discussions of rule 44 and
guidelines for its application.
Thevenot v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Asso-
ciation of America49 was a suit by a woman on a policy insuring
her husband against accidental death. The husband had been
killed during a struggle with the wife over a gun, which the wife
was brandishing while commanding her husband's suspected
mistress to leave the wife's home. Plaintiff had been tried for
42. See Annot., 160 A.L.R. 605 (1946).
43. American Agricultural Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 206 S.C. 355, 34 S.E.2d 592 (1945).
44. 258 S.C. at 446-47, 189 S.E.2d at 33 (1972).
45. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 495 (1947).
46. 214 S.C. 305, 52 S.E.2d 419 (1949).
47. Id. at 313, 52 S.E.2d at 422.
48. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 44 (effective June 1, 1969).
49. 259 S.C. 235, 191 S.E.2d 251 (1972).
[Vol. 25
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murder but had been acquitted. The defendant insurer answered
by alleging that the insured husband's death was a foreseeable
consequence of his own conduct, and therefore not accidental
within the meaning of the policy. On the affidavits of both par-
ties, the trial judge granted plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that "[t]he evidence would not permit a jury to
find that the insured should have foreseen that his conduct would
bring about the injury from which he died."5
The supreme court seemed disturbed that neither of the affi-
davits of counsel appeared in the transcript of record, with the
only relevant documents being unsworn statements of four law
enforcement officers and one eyewitness to the shooting. The
court described these statements as sketchy and self-
contradictory on crucial points, being mostly hearsay. The court
stated that "[t]he appropriateness of granting summary judg-
ment on evidence of this character is doubtful."5' Since defendant
had only asserted that the statements, if taken as true, were
insufficient to support the order, the court proceeded to further
discussion. The court emphasized that on a motion for summary
judgment all inferences must be drawn in favor of the party op-
posing the motion; also that summary judgment should be
granted only where there is no dispute as to either the evidentiary
facts in the case or the conclusions to be drawn from them. Conse-
quently, the court reviewed the evidence in somewhat more de-
tail, concluding that a jury might decide that a reasonably pru-
dent man in the insured's position would have realized that it was
foolhardy to grapple with his wife for the gun. Therefore, this
question should have been submitted to the jury, and the sum-
mary judgment order was improper.
In Spencer v. Miller 2 the plaintiff was an attorney seeking
to recover $3071 as compensation primarily for a title search and
certification used by defendant to procure a mortgage loan of
$625,000. This fee was admittedly the amount calculable from the
York County Bar rates, but defendant contended it was not the
amount agreed upon and did not constitute reasonable compen-
sation under the circumstances. Plaintiff moved for summary
judgment, and affidavits were filed by both parties. The trial
court granted plaintiff's motion.
50. Id. at 237, 191 S.E.2d at 251.
51. Id. at 238, 191 S.E.2d at 252.
52. 259 S.C. 453, 192 S.E.2d 863 (1972).
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The supreme court noted that the federal summary judg-
ment rule 3 is similar to the South Carolina rule, and hence that
federal court decisions could be instructive in view of the scarcity
of South Carolina decisions. It then noted a number of guiding
principles to be drawn from South Carolina and federal cases:
The accompanying affidavits should be evidentiary in nature and
not merely statements of ultimate facts and conclusions; the
court's function is merely to determine whether there is any genu-
ine issue of material fact; the ruling must be made on the record
actually presented; the papers supporting the motion are closely
scrutinized, while the opponent's are indulgently treated; there
is no magic formula to determine the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact.
In the case at hand, defendant admitted in his affidavit that
he knew the York County Bar rates and that plaintiff had quoted
these rates to him as the fee prior to doing the work. Defendant
objected to the rates but plaintiff quoted no others. Subse-
quently, according to defendant, he telephoned plaintiff and told
him to issue the mortgagee binder, with no further mention of the
fee. Defendant also stated that plaintiff did no work other than
that which he had already been required to do for the previous
seller of the land, but the court rejected this as an ultimate fact
insufficient to raise any genuine issue.
On this record the court affirmed the granting of summary
judgment for plaintiff. It noted that in order to comply with de-
fendant's request that he issue the binder, it was absolutely nec-
essary for plaintiff to search and certify the title. Because only
one fee had ever been mentioned for the title search and certifica-
tion, the only reasonable inference was that defendant was im-
pliedly agreeing to that fee. Because there was no other factual
dispute, summary judgment was appropriate.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS
The plaintiff in Vandross v. Ellisor54 sought to invoke the
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina in order to have his name printed upon the ballot
for a state senate seat in the Democratic primary. The court
denied his prayer for relief (except for ordering a refund of the
53. FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(c).
54. 347 F. Supp. 197 (D.S.C. 1972).
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filing fee he had paid) and dismissed the complaint because of a
lack of federal jurisdiction.
District Judge Hemphill felt that the only possible vehicle for
jurisdiction was the broad and now familiar language of title 42,
section 1983 of the United States Code.5 However, he felt it well
established that the opportunity to become a candidate for state
office is not a right rising to federal protection, citing primarily
the 1944 Supreme Court case of Snowden v. Hughes." It is a right
or privilege of state citizenship only. Since there was apparently
no allegation of any discrimination which could be a state denial
of equal protection, there was simply no possible deprivation of
any federal rights, privileges or immunities within the language
of section 1983.
The court nevertheless considered the substantive issues, in
case an appellate court should find federal jurisdiction."7 It found
as a fact that plaintiff did not offer his intention of candidacy
until several minutes after the statutory deadline. It also affirmed
that such deadlines are almost universally held to be mandatory,
and that in any event plaintiff had offered no significant excuse
for being late. Hence he would not have obtained relief even if
jurisdiction were present.
Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co.5 was an action
against several defendants, including the International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), alleging em-
ployment discrimination on the bases of race and sex. The ac-
tion was instituted pursuant to title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act." This order was concerned only with IAM's motion to dis-
miss for want of proper service and venue. The motion was denied
on both grounds.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
56. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
57. The words of the court in this context are worth noting:
Despite this court's conviction that jurisdiction does not exist, in the light of
those judicial bombshells by which appellate courts, in the past, have used
judicial fiat to enlarge and abort the limited federal jurisdiction originally in-
tended by Congress, this court will treat the issues as and if jurisdiction existed.
347 F. Supp. at 202.
58. 347 F. Supp. 436 (D.S.C. 1972).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
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The question of venue presented little difficulty, for Judge
Hemphill found that South Carolina was both "the judicial dis-
trict . . . in which the claim arose,""o and the district "in which
the unlawful employment practice [was] alleged to have been
committed."6 The first of these factors is one criterion for proper
venue of any civil action, while the second is incorporated in the
1964 Civil Rights Act itself.
With respect to the claimed lack of jurisdiction because of
improper service, the key issue was whether jurisdiction was ob-
tained pursuant to the long-arm statute 2 embedded in South
Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code. If it was so
obtained, service by a United States Marshal in the District of
Columbia leaving a copy of the summons with an officer of 1AM
was clearly sufficient under that Act.63
There was evidence that an IAM representative had dealt
with Local 1779 in South Carolina pursuant to a contract between
IAM and Local 1779, and that the complaint alleged IAM to be
the superior union to Local 1779. There was also a deposition from
the representative describing in some detail his activities and
time spent in South Carolina on behalf of IAM. From these facts
the court decided that accepting jurisdiction would not offend the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It also noted
that, within the language of the long-arm statute, this was a
prima facie showing that IAM was transacting business in the
state (section 10.2-803(1) (a)) and was a party to a contract to
supply services in the state (section 10.2-803(1)(b)).
The remaining question was whether relevant parts of the
long-arm statute were in violation of the South Carolina Consti-
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1970).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803 (1962), which reads in part as follows:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly
or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this State;
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party
in this State;
(2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted
against him, and such action, if brought in this State, shall not be subject to
the provisions of § 10-310(3).
63. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-806(1) (1962).
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tution because they pertained to a subject not expressed in the
title of the Act.64 Certain subsections relating to tortious acts
committed in the state or resulting in injury within the state had
been held unconstitutional on that basis,6" but the court consid-
ered those subsections severable. It stated that there was "no
serious contention that [subsections] (1)(a),(b), or (g) violate
the South Carolina Constitution .. ."" The court quoted a
lengthy passage from a case 7 upholding section 10.2-803(1)(g)
against just such a challenge, finding that the subject was covered
by a phrase in the Act's title on regulation of procedure in actions
involving certain contracts and transactions. Apparently the
same reasoning was thus adopted for subsections (a) and (b).
J.H. TEDARDS, JR.
64. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 17, reads as follows: "Every Act or resolution having the
force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." See
Survey of Legislation supra.
65. See, e.g., Tention v. Southern Pac. R.R., 336 F. Supp. 25 (D.S.C. 1972).
66. 347 F. Supp. 436, 441 (D.S.C. 1972) (emphasis added).
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